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DESIGN ERRORS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
Introduction 
This note started as a study of design errors in process plant, 
with the objective of finding the most relevant techniques for 
removing those errors. The most readily available records with 
sufficient incident detail were the abnormal occurrence reports 
for light water reactors. 
As the study of these reports proceeded, it became clear that 
the data was very relevant to nuclear power plant reliability 
analysis, and the objectives of the study were changed. Random 
component failure due to effects which cannot be prevented, is 
presumably the most frequent cause of faults in process plant, 
and is the kind of failure normally treated in reliability analyses. 
But redundancy techniques and reliability theory seem to have 
reduced the significance of random component failure in nuclear 
power plant, until it is only one of several contributors to 
safety related incidents. Other mechanisms such as operator error, 
maintenance and installation error, play a large part in these 
incidents. A significant contributor is design error. 
For these reasons, the scope of the study was broadened. All 
of the abnormal occurrences reported for two power plants during 
one year were analysed and classified, in order to be able to 
relate design errors to other causes of failure. To enhance the 
relevance to reliability analysis, incidents occurring after grant 
of operating licence were studied, rather than problems during 
construction. And emphasis was placed on common mode effects. 
In what follows, a type study of different kinds of design 
error is presented, with examples. Then the results of two stat-
istical studies are described, one directed towards classification 
of design errors, the other towards determining the significance 
of design errors for reliability. Some conclusions are presented, 
and techniques for avoiding design errors are discussed. 
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What are desian errors? 
A series of cases of design error were studied, and a stat-
istical survey of design errors was made, to enable the effective-
ness of design checking techniques to be studied. 
In order to make such a study, i t is desirable to be able to 
define what is meant by design error. If one takes the view that 
all failure is to be avoided, at any cost, then any failure can 
be regarded as a design error. In practice, this approach is too 
costly. A designer must accept a certain rate of failure. 
A definition of design error which may be acceptable theor-
etically, is that a design error is considered to have occurred, 
if the functional specification of a plant component cannot be 
fulfilled by a given design. But this definition is useless in 
practii.?, because functional specifications are rarely made 
explicit and complete. 
A better definition is that a design error i s considered to 
have occurred, if, in the light of experience of use of a system, 
an alternative design is considered preferable. This definition 
has a 'disadvantage' that i t includes errors which arise 
because some phenomenon is completely unknown at the time the 
design was completed. But such 'errors' are also interesting. The 
definition makes it possible to use a very simple criterion in 
statistical studies - if the equipment is modified as a result of 
experience of failure, then the failure was caused by design 
errors. This criterion will however introduce a bias into stat-
istical studies, because of the effect described in the following 
quotation „ ^
 cgmeUflt j ,^,, , ttken in „,,„,„,. 
to equipment failures in many instances hne 
been to repair the equipment or replace it in 
hind and haw not always been guided by a clear 
identification of the true cause of failure. Analysis 
of the causes of forced outages in both nuclear 
related and non-nuclear related equipment sug-
gests that in many instances the design was 
deficient for the Intended service. 
des ign error 
c a l c u l a t i o n 
error 
des ign requirement 
r e c o g n i s e d , but wrong 
s o l u t i o n adopted 
accepted c a l c u l a t i o n 
metMd does not cover 
c a s e , or accepted 
des ign method f a u l t y 
(due t o o ther reasons 
g iven h e r e ) , or com-
p l e t e a n a l y s i s t o o 
d i f f i c u l t t o arr ive 
at a s o l u t i o n every 
time 
des ign requirement 
not recognised 
.error invo lves phenomenon 
unknown a t des ign time 
Information on phenomenon 
not a v a i l a b l e t o des igner 
at des ign t ime. 
[ Error i n v o l v e s phenomena 
a r i s i n g from e f f e c t s in 
d i f f e r e n t areas of des ign 
expert i s e . 
Typing; read ing; drawii.g; 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n error 
Error a r i s e s from complex 
f i n t e r a c t i o n s which could not 
be analysed , pos ib ly because 
of a n a l y s i s c o s t . 
Simple overs ight 
f i g . 1 C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f des ign errors according t o cause . 
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In the statistical study some atten.pt was Bade to correct 
this bias, by detailed analysis of some frequent types of failure. 
Classification of errors is essential, if the effectiveness 
of techniques for avoiding error is to be judged. A classification 
of design errors according to cause is shown in fig. 1. It is 
difficult to apply such a classification to particular cases, 
because of lack of information. Even interviews with designers 
cannot always lead to an accurate classification. However, an 
attempt has been made. The results should be viewed with caution. 
The examples which follow are mostly taken from safety related 
occurrence reports for light water nuclear reactors. The reason 
for this is not that such reactors are especially failure prone, 
but because the documentation for nuclear reactor failures 
achieves a much higher standard and is'much more thorough, than 
for most other types of process plant. This makes study easier. 
NASA also collect failure data in a similar way, and achieve a 
high standard of case reporting. 
Example 1 
In some cases a des ign error can a r i s e because tr.e necessary 
information which would a l low correct d e s i g n , i s simply unavai l -
a b l e . There i s no complete s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem, but mater ia l s 
and prototype t e s t i n g reduces the problem. 
As reported In our letter of September 15, 1971, during an operability teat of 
the 1I1(A Pressure Coolant Injection (HTCI) system, the HPCl steam line Isolation 
vilves tripped closed from a false high steam flow signal. Backf lushing of the 
flow elbow sensing linea appeered to cc-rrect t i* observed Increase in the differ-
ential pressure measurements i'roc the fcPCI steam line elbow tape; however, fre-
quency ol testing cf the HPOI system was increased to once per week, after Its 
return to rervice, with additional recording of elbow tap pressures to determine 
that the observed change In flow eju>ov differential pressure waa not a recurring 
probles. 
On tbe f i r s t weekly test on September 18, 1971, following tbe return to service 
of the HPCI system, and while operating at 90* power, It waa found that tbe flov 
elbow differential pressure bad again Increased, causing tbe HPCI steam line to 
Isolate. A review of HPCI tests previous to these two showed that a l l eueeesa-
ful testing bad been completed under low mam steam flow conditions and that tbe 
unsuccessful teats were conducted with approximately 90$ of rated »team flow. 
Based upon this new information, i t was demonstrated that tbe differential pres-
sure at the HPCI steam l ine flow elbow, which Is directly connected to a saddle 
on tbe HPCI steam l ine , wi l l be affected by the flow in tbe main steam l ine. 
these effects become so pronounced above 50> of rated flow in tbe asm steam 
l ines , that whan testing tbe HPCI system i t automatically Isolates after b5 sec-
onds because the differential pressure Indications remain higher than the reset 
value* of tbe 150,000 lb per hour flew sensors. Bits effect on tbe flow elbow 
differential pleasure prevents full completion of the HPCI system flow rate 
tast* under conditions of high reactor power; liovever, the conditions under which 
tte »CI i s required to function (low-low reactor water level and high dryvell 
pressure) also result in a reactor scram and a main steam line isolation. B » s , 
Docket 50-263 
for an automatic HPCI initiation, tbe main steam flow will drop to aero within 
5 ceconda and allow tbe 150,000 lb per hour flow sensors to reset well before 
tbe end of the »5 second time delay. 
Pending further review of means for development of a practicable method for re-
solving tbe flow diaturbance effects on tbe HPCI system ateaa line elbow tap«, 
quarterly flow rate testing of the HFCI system was planned to be conducted with 
tbe "I" staaa Una isolated for tbe abort period of time required t o ccamleta 
this tast . If condition* develop requiring HPCI init iation during tot period 
of Mating, proper functioning of the HPCI system wil l occur as required. 
Engineering studies have bean completed on various method* to eliminate the flow 
disturbance effects on the HPCI system steam line elbow taps and tb* preferred 
ol tenpt* boa bam determined, we have initiated detailed enginaarlag and pro-
curement of materiale to laataU a Ohlveraal Venturi Tut« piping aptiliou to as* 
place tbe piece of piping between the existing IPCI steam 1 1 M flow albs* ami 
mTCX isolation valve MV2C3* a* shewn on tb* attached sketch, fa* aav flaw 
device wil l u t i l i s e tbe exKtlog control logic and where compatlbl*, tka arte*. 
lag equipment, lb* KP Universal Venturi lube primary flov aeterlag dart** a t U 
provide sufficient accuracy and rel iabil i ty, aa a replacement far the alba* flaw 
••*•'»»•»'* « * r t « , to permit flov rat* testing of the HPCI ayataa vttboat tbe 
need for "H" »team line isolation. 
Example 2 
When f a i l u r e e f f e c t s involve phenomena which cross des ign 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n boundaries, lack of communication between engineers 
can lead to lack of design ana lys i s and checking. The fo l lowing 
incident involv ing both steam c i r c u i t s and ion exchange sys tems , 
may have been an example of t h i s kind. 
»be salt vae in the p r o w of »Ma« otarted op follortn« • 
•bort ecfaadaled aalBtenance oaten* *•»» *>aat an* boar efter eynchro-
nliln« tba nenamter. I t KM noticed that tbe prlaary coolant oooductlTlty 
vae lnerenetng. At 1010 boon, tba recorder (novel 10 altos. »ban n t 
eaaplee confined una blnb value, a m e t e r ebutdovn was Initiated at 
loeoi 
Aa laaadlate lnvaetleStlon of the cans* doternlBad that tba 
raalna la the raactor cleanup daednarannr bid diiiianjoaall Ana to blab 
teaperatare. A fraab bod of resins a n almead late tba dandaerallser 
aid, following further cleanup of tba prlaary coolant, tba salt a n re-
turned to service about 26 boon after tba sbutdovn. 
/• 
The naulta of the Investigation ara aa follows: 
1. Ibe nalna bad daeoapoaad daa to high l—naialma raaetor 
vater bains drawn throve« tba daadnaralHar during bloadoan of tht prl-
aarjr systen for avail darls« beatup. ' 
S. the operator bad not bam alerted to tba rials« conduetlTlty 
ana to failure of tba slant circuit vbleb opsrataa off tba recorder. Bi le ' 
•ana failure alao prevented tba cleanup puap froa trlpplo« oa high ten- -— 
perater* and protactlnf tba raala bad. Inspection of tola recorder fol -
lowing: tba incident revealed tbnt both aata of contact! operated aoraally 
wltb tba recorder door open, but would not operate with tba door cloeed. 
fbla situation baa baas corrected. 
Docket 
50-1S5 
Febr. 
1970 
20 
Corrective actions that have teen lnctltuted are aa fo l low. 
1. Problem* with the alarm and punp trip circuitry haws been 
corrected. 
2. Tbe operating procedure« hive been reviewed and revised to 
require that the cleanup aysteu be valved out vbenever blovdovn of tba 
primary »yeteu 1» necessary with primary syaten preaaure above 50 pal«. 
Below 50 palg, the preaent operating practice will be maintained alnoa, 
at low presaure, the cleanup pump head Is neceaaary to aaaure adequate 
blovlovn flow. 
in conclaalon, no deaage to equipment resulted from this lncl-
dent. Th« actlona of the operating peraonnel were prompt and proper, and 
i t la felt that the corrective action taken will preclude recurrence. 
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The only s o l u t i o n to problems of t h i s kind i s to improve 
communication. The information t o be t rans ferred i n v o l v e s 'unusual 
e f f e c t s 1 i n one p iece of equipment and 'unusual consequences' 
i n another p iece of equipment. Design review d i s c u s s i o n s invo lv ing 
s e v e r a l eng ineers with d i f f e r e n t s p e c i a l i t i e s can help in t h i s 
r e s p e c t . More d e t a i l e d des ign s p e c i f i c a t i o n s inc luding d e s c r i p t i o n 
of p o s s i b l e f a i l u r e modes could a l s o help in making appropriate 
information a c c e s s i b l e t o other e n g i n e e r s , although t h i s in only 
r e a l l y p o s s i b l e at the 'Component' l e v e l , and not at the system 
l e v e l . 
NASA c l a s s i f y errors invo lv ing d i f f e r e n t areas of experience 
as ' compatabi l i ty problems' 
Manual space program a c c i d e n t / 
inc ident summaries 1970-71 
Cranston Research i n c . 
Apri l 1972 N 73-1887 
8 
Example 3 
In September l°67, approximately I year after Ihe 
incident, following a complete drain of the sodium 
from the reactor vessel, an ubject was discovered on 
the bottom of the inlet plenum. The object was 
tentatively identined as a segment of zirconium liner 
From the conical flow guide (see Figs. 2 and Si-
Retrieval devices were fabricated and, by the end of 
March 1968, the segment was retrieved arid its identity 
confirmed. The reactor vessel was then refilled with 
sodium to clean up the oxide deposits that had resulted 
from the removal operations. 
Efforts were then made to remove the remaining 
segments presumably still attached to the conical Row 
gtude. After fabrication of the necessary tools for the 
removal operations, the sodium was again drained from 
the reactor in November 1968; it was then that a 
second segment was discovered missing from the 
conical flow guide. By the end of 1968 the missing 
segment had been found lodged against the underside 
of the lower care-support plate, and all the segment* 
had been removed from the reactor. Figure 9 shows 
several views »f the two detached zirconium wgnwnte 
that were retrieved. 
Following the discovery of the detached »reunion. 
segments, a series uf hydraulic tests was performed 
which confirmed that the coolant-flow blockage that 
resulted in the fuel melting was indeed caused hy one 
«l the loose zirconium segments from the conical flow 
pride. 
The zirconium liners had been instiillcd in 1959, 
ble m the construction phase, at a time when it was 
believed that provisions should be made for occur- _ 
inwes which might result in substantial fuel melting. I 
The liners were intended to augment the vessel 
reueiration barrier in lh? lower plenum in the event 
"when uranium alloy dropped out of the core into the 
liwer plenum. 
Sis itiangulat 4U-mit.-thi.ck -/.Uc<*mim wpnen^ 
»ere hand-formed to enver the contour ol the conical 
tow guide. Each segment was attached by means or 
three zirconium machine screw, ønd the screws were 
then tack welded to the segments. 
The hydiodynarnic forces of the coolant had 
caused sufficient flutter in two uf these segments to 
break them loose front the machine screws by which 
they were attached. The hydrodynamic force then 
carried one of the segments up lo the nozzle inlets and 
restricted the coolant flow fn the fencnl area of the 
two adjacent subassemblies that iirbsequeirtly melted. 
The abnormal temperatures (hat had preMowh; 
been observed In September 1966 and subsequently 
identified t« hvte \Ktv«ied .rt June and again in August 
prior to the fuel-melting Incident have since itlso been 
attributed to partial flow blockage by one of the loose 
i zirconium segments.31 
Lest-Mrnwt« Design Ghana« 
The installation of the zirconium liners was appar-
ently made in response to the concern for the 
consequences of a mulien fuel drop as expressed by the 
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).4 
The response lo the concern expressed by the ACRS 
was certainly justification Tor the installation of the 
Urters, but it is the authur *s opinion that it did not 
justify short-circuiting existing quality-assurance pro-
cedures. Another point was raised by Representative 
Craig Hosmcr (-R., Calif.) in discussing the incident 
during the hearings before the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy fJCAE) in January and February 1968 
< Ref. 4). That point was whether it was easiei tu install 
the zirconium sheets •• which cost "about a hundred 
bucks"— than to justify TK* doing so to the ACRS. 
The question as considered by PRDC was whether or 
not to provide the additional "engineered safeguard*' 
prior to buttoning up the primary system and filling 
with sodium. The decision was in favor of the apparent 
increased safety. Upon later analysis it was concluded 
that the zirconium segments were not necessary, so all 
the remaining segments were removed from the reactor 
in December 1968. 
With a Mile reflection, it Tthmdd be apparent that 
when concerns are expressed or decisions are made 
regarding design, technical problems, or safely issues, 
they should he attacked with a disciplined engineering 
•oach, with due consideration for codes, standards, 
proof-testing, which make up quality assurance. 
NUCLEAft SAFETY, ver. 12. H». 2, MMch-Aprir W ) l 
Design changes and 
repair often give rise to 
'simple oversights', 
for example of a design 
checking stage* 
Example ** 
When human be ings make a des ign check, t hey t e n d t o be l e d 
t c ' t h e most l i k e l y c a u s e ' o± f a i l u r e . This p r o v i d e s a s t r o n g 
argument f o r c r o s s checking us ing computer methods , t o suppor t 
t h e human b e i n g s , s i n c e t h e computer can s y s t e m a t i c a l l y i n v e s -
t i g a t e even u n l i k e l y c a u s e s . 
I t shou ld be p o s s i b l e t o des ign in format ion systems t o h e l p 
p r e v e n t problems l i k e t h e fo l l owing s e r i e s . 
I Inspection at the t i n * o f th* f i r s t fai lure of the BO tor revealed 
damage had been caused by overheating. After repair« vcre u d e * 
to« motor was s a t i s f a c t o r i l y tes ted and pot into serv ice .
 R Q£ 
After the second fa i lure , the notor wss again taken out of serv ice 71-8 
sad repaired. During post-**lnteaance inspection of th« notor 
prior to »turning It to service* It was discovered that the 
Interpol* phasing of th* motor was reversed. I f the notor had 
been placed in service, this condition would have led to overheat inn. 
After the third failure, the notor was again dlsessenblsd; this 
tin* under the supervision of two qualified technical people. 
from this inspection, i t was determined that th* iusulstlca had 
again overheat ad. although i t net the appropriate specifications. 
Close scrutiny revealed that the enanel on the rotor windings had 
not been properly cared. The enamel had softened and the reduc-
tion of clearances caused a locked rotor condition which resulted 
In eh* overheating of th* lnanlatlo*. 
2 D0CK I an writing to iafora you of a failure of a noter operated
 t n , 
during an operational cheek prior to Unit ' reactor startup. b l 
VI ^ V 0 0 W l 0 l » t b # n o r t h ••»rgeocy condanaar condensate valve, 
id failed previously this year. This was reported to you in ay 
* dated April 30, 1970. / - j 
Unit 1 was shutdown on August 23, 1970, for miscellaneous 
; repairs. During a check prior to »tartup, HO 101 failed to 
The noter was removed and dlMssamtbUd and Inapsetlon indicated 
rheating condition and needed extensive repairs. The notor wss 
o a local shop for rewinding. 
Open conplatlon of the repair*, th* notor waa given a final 
out and i t was discovered that th« Interpols phasing was reversed, 
mild have resulted la overheating If the tutor had bean put in 
ion in this condition. This eefsct wss corrected and th« meter 
turned to »arvtee. 
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Example 5 
Sometimes interactions in a system are so complex that it is 
unreasonable to expect a designer to anticipate them, even thougn 
the error is classed as a design error. 
H M eauaa of tha air ayatem failure waa the complete 
aAiytar« of a, 4>in«h Btainlesa ateel fleilhla connection mounted 
•a tha discharge aide' of Air Coapreaaor 1-2. when the flexible 
eaaaaetlon fmU*d. It atruck the compresaor hish temperature trip DOCKET SO 
matten vale* eauaed tha eomprasaor to trip. Air Compreaaor 1-1 
atartad automatically hut warn unable to keep up with the air loaa. 'fx" 1:"= 
mubaequently. Air Compreaaor 1-2 diacharge valve vaa 
closed which isolated it from the air receiver and permitted the 
air pressure to build up. It is estimated that pressure waa 
restored to normal in approximately 15 minutes. There were no 
spare flexible connections at the site so a solid spool piece 
waa fabricated and installed to provide a temporary emergency 
hack-up supply of air, and the compressor temperature switch 
vat repaired. It waa also noted that there waa axial misalignment 
of li> e-^jirecror discharge and the pipe connected to the receiver. 
Ti.ir; ^ ralienaer.t was corrected prior to Installing the temporary 
spo-. pie«-. A rush order was placed for new flexible connections, 
and the temporary spool piece has been replaced with a new connection 
for Air Ccaprozsor 2-1. The connection will he replaced on Air 
Ccoprtcsor 1-i aj soon as it arrives. In addition, a study haa 
been initiated to redesign the compressor discharge piping ayatem 
to prevent a recurrence of this event. 
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Example 6 
In other cases, newer methods, such as sneak path analysis 
or cause consequence analysis can discover failure potential in 
such complex systems. 
The primary scram system of the N reactor failed 
to operate on signal because of undetected failures of 
diodes in the scram circuit. The reactor was shut down 
promptly, however, by the backup ball safety system. 
The reliability of the primary scram system was 
improved, after the fact, by the addition of an 
administratively controlled switch in the main circuit. 
Reactor designers and operators count on the low 
probability of the failure of any given primary safety 
system of a nuclear reactor. They do recognize, 
however, that failures are possible and that effective 
and independent secondary systems must be available. 
When a failure occurs, every advantage must be taken 
of Ihc knowledge gained in the determination of cause 
and effect. The probable reason for the N reactor diode 
supply just ahead of the scram relays. When a 
rod-assignment switch is in the Off or Withdrawal 
position, this circuit places a holding voltage on the V9 
stram solenoid to prevent the rod from scramming if a 
reactor scrim trip occurs. This is a maintenance feature 
to prevent rods out of service from suddenly moving 
into the reactor. 
Electrical measurements taken across the V9 scram 
solenoids gave voltage measurements in the range 65 to 
95 V, with the highest voltage (95 V) being across 
59V9, the rod No. 59 scram solenoid. A current 
measurement gave about 10 A flowing through the 
IB9-I breaker (breaker trip selling, 12.5 A). Further 
review indicated thai a possible electrical path for 
connection of the circuits coald be developed by the 
combination of font diodes failing in the shorted aaafe 
m the electrical circuit of a rod, along with that taaTs, 
assignment switch being in the WjtMmwal or Off 
position. Rod No. 59 became the prime saspact be-
cause it was the only rod in dteOfTaneib^nasntJ 
also snows the current podt f r o * the niiBajjr cimwt 
through rods 59 and 3. AD other rod TokncHi wwaM 
be similarly energized owing to the paiilel*WBg 
characteristics of the circuit. A *wa l snipiniaa 
showed ihiti the No. 59 rod diode qwd package sns 
cracked and thai a drop of solder protrvded tkeoagh 
the crack midway up the canister. Arthoogh the Ivar 
diodes in a rod circuit ave efectricaly connected as 
shown, ihey ar« physically situated i t a plug-in lawjilu 
I called a diode quad package that closely riMWhlft a 
| metallic vacuum tube. 
NuCLtAfl »»MTV. V*." M. « • •> *mm*m^Qm^» 
- 1 3 
5904 TEST 
MTHOfUWAL OA Of F • 
ROD &9 SCR4M SOLEWOtQX' 
59*9 • 
T — 
WITHDRAWAL 
1 I I O O S 4 1 - M a n O « i - 6 » S f f t « L M 1 EXCEPT m - M S AND Kflg COWTACTS OPCWT" 
1 0 4 0 9 
' 1 f 
WITHDRAWAL Oft OFF 
SCRAM 
TCST ROD tO« SOLENOID 
V-104V9 
KM09 
t04K92 
II 
BOOS Tt - 1 0 3 AHO M » - (07 J-
CIRCUIT SHOW« AS POUND SEPTEMBER 30 l»70 
CURRENT PMH SHOWN FOR TOO J AND WO 59 
» u OTHER »005' CURRENT P*TMS SIMILAR TO ROD J 
F» . l I 
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Example 8 
Simple oversight is a cause of some design errors, and may 
have been involved in the following incidents. 
Docket 50219 
110 
'The event of the turbine trip van preceded by an oselllatlam 
of approximately 2 to 5 W e in generator load. Steam flow began to 
fluctuate and reactor procure decreased slightly. The generator bad 
been operatis« at 530 Mte, approximately 1600 MM, and load was reduced 
to 1)00 MWe by recirculation flow, when the oscillation ceased. At tals 
pQjflt, the turbine tripped. 
Upon occasion, the turbinj control valve cams have been known 
to contribute toward an oscTTJaETon In load at hi»h"valvé**oiienin« posi-
tions clue to the control valve loop gain being higher at these positions. 
Up to the valve position associated with apprnul—tely $00 lite, the 
loojo gain is constant. However, oscillations can occur above 500 Mis 
If • perturbation, such as a load swing or pressure spun, war* to 
occur at the higher valve open positions. The perturbation which 
precipitated this event was the result of load swings brought about 
while backwasbing the main condensers. The remedy has been to reduce 
the load to a more stable cam position, eliminate the oscillations, 
and recover to the desired electrical load. In addition, until the 
cams are replaced, operations which may cause an upset are performed 
at a lower load. 
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Example 9 
Some simple oversight errors occur several times 
Ping n)n* villi *»••. If Ud, cut be 
vvs*, Mvl ar br*Mnn. , 
Plant operators 
Manual 196S 
SM Elonka 
ROE 
72-15 
2 It was concluded that the probable cause of failure was the 
actuation of the safety relief valve that was set at 1085 psig. 
The dynamic loading resulting from the actuation of this valve, 
combined with the condensate in the line, exerted a bending 
moment and torsional stress on the header at the location of the 
valve attachment. Since the architect-engineer had not taken 
these overstressing forces into account in the original design, 
the valve attachment was not fabricated to withstand this dynamic 
loading and the valve tore loose from the header at a point 
opposite the valve discharge stack. The two other valves failed 
e l The control system of the decay-heat release valve 
is designed so that, if i remote manual signal is 
imposed on the electropneurMtlc converter, the 
poaiioeer output pressure wfitl contlnlie to increase 
until the unbalanced control signal u satisfied by 
feedback from actual valve movement. If the valve does 
not open to provide this feedback agn J, the positioner 
pneumatic output pressure v t ] ccl lnue to increase 
until it reaches the pressure that exists at the full-open 
position of the valve. Arm the incident the valve was 
disassembled and inspected, but there were no indica-
tions of stem wear. 
The release Hue from the valve normally extended 
I Tried«V4«wrnonl,^veth««ur.d.h.incl- * £ * ? " T T £ l ^ ' . ^ "° V" V'*!? 
* j ~ . L. . AJ. _«._.«» _i_ . .k_«i~ .Mfe.it. """•d- Th* •mady-staU thrust resulting from the 
£ 1 1 iZETSLZL t£Z?Zr£% * * " • • <"""•« «» •"**""> *»«» condition. 
Natl operated iwcwsfyly shout 20 time, pavsraay. „,,
 m m amtfimnt lmil fc „,, „,,,, F o I m l l 
Bat imtiuiami] jajurles were a t tarsal a t jrteecotaite „ „ , , , ^ ^
 W C M - B 1 | „j,,., w ,„, ,„ 
earns* cfttw|»>lr>| for rim top** * *, ftp,
 m , „to </, tym* h.4 
ajmllsag Arm rapid opming of the valve to iu 
Ml-open poertkn. 
NUCUM sUStrv, vw. H. Ms. t, jaaaan 'server« i 
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Ixarr.ple IC 
A ca lcu la t ion error . 
Burlag *** raeaat rafaallaa narsaa. I t aa* slsmiaieit that aVa rlaat 
•Islag calcvlatloa* for (ha aata ataaa Moaoat paasls a a n taaai aa 
blouout at 0.5 paU iaataad af 0.23 sa l t aa sascTibai la tha anatlcelle 
n å i . 
i a taaialyala, avary otaar t iset aaa i l u s ' trom tka J—nat« af 
tha «all fiaaa aai paaal fraaa of aaeh aaaal. la tba aaaal aastaa la baaaa 
aa rime ihMi, atlllrarton of half tfca aaakar af tlvata i i m U a i far a 
aaslan bloaoat at 0.25 paU. 
Docket 50-263 
May 23 1973 
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Statistical study I 
Some idea of the significant r6le played by design error 
can be obtained by studying summary data. In the following two 
tables, the causes of system failure are presented for the NASA 
manned space program in 1970-71 and for boiling water reactors 
in 1970. 
For conventional plant design errors are costly, but not 
much more so than equipment failures due to wear. The proportion 
of failure attributable to design errors and to equipment failure 
are similar. Some cases of design error are included in equipment 
error statistics, due to inaccuracies in reporting. All of this 
means that failure cost estimates based on equipment failures 
alone will not be too inaccurate (within an order of magnitude). 
For nuclear plant, aircraft, certain military equipment etc. 
there are some failure modes which lead to expecially severe 
consequences. Their frequency is fortunately, generally low. It 
is important, however, to find out if these serious failures 
are associated with design errors because 'reliability* approaches 
to design, such as providing safety margins and redundancy, are 
not so effective in preventing design error failures. For the 
same reason it is important to know if common mode failures are 
associated with design errors. 
The records of failure reported in 'safety related occurrences 
reported in 1970* (Scott & Gallaher 1971), for boiling water 
reactors, were analysed according to cause and seriousness. The 
cause classifications were 
Equipment 
Design 
Installation 
Fabri cation 
Operator/administration 
Maintenance 
E 
D 
I 
F 
0 
M 
In Asking these classifications, heavy reliance was placed 
on the keywording provided by 0RNL staff in their report. In 
addition, original documents were inspected, and any incident 
which resulted in a design change, was deemed to result from a 
design error (This provides a simple criterion). 
T O . . 
J » . 
Fig . 2 
Taken from, Manual space programs A c c i d e n t / I n c i d e n t Summaries 1970-1971. 
(Cranston Research INC. Alexandria Va.) Apr i l 1972 , N73-1B87 
Takl* 1. Svmmry «** BUR Problcoa 
m. ,1111 .1 . 
•ea inane« 
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3 . 5 
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(30) 
<20) 
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(10) 
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( 6) 
( 6) 
( 6) 
( 6) 
( 2 ) 
( 2) 
( 1) 
( l ) 
( 1) 
I'D ( 1) 
( 1 ) 
(27) 
(10) 
( T) 
( 2 ) 
( 2) 
( 2) 
( 2 ) 
< 1) 
Syateas 
Main c o o l i n g 
ContaiivMot i s o l a t i o n 
Safe ty 
Control 
Inergeney povar 
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IPC] 
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Stack 
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«. 
15 
10 
10 
9 
a 5 
k 
k 
k 
li 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
) 1 
1 
<1 
<1 
<l 
<1 
<1 
«1 
<1 
«1 
<1 
<1 
<1 
<1 
<1 
•o. 
(31) 
(a) (20) 
(19) 
(16) 
(11) 
( 9) 
( 9) 
( 8) 
( 9) 
( 6, 
( 7) 
( <) 
< 5) 
( 5) 
( 5) 
< 2) 
' 2) 
( 3) 
( 2) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
Cauaee 
leklatemenee error 
Operator error 
Oeaign error 
I n s t a l l a t i o n error 
Fabricat ion error 
8 t r e i a corroaion 
Admlalatratlve con-
t r o l 
Babrla 
Vibration 
Corroilon 
Thermal straaa 
Tnuaderetorm 
Fatigue 
S. 
32 
IS 
15 
10 
9 
a 
» 
2 
1 
<1 
«1 
<1 
«1 
Bo. 
(*T) 
( 2 D ) 
(22) 
(15) 
(13) 
( 9) 
1 6) 
( 3) 
( 2) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
( 1) 
Taken from: Sa fe ty Related occurrences in nuc l ear f a c i l i t i e s i n 1971 
R.L. Sco t t and R.B. Gal laher ORNL-NSIC-106 
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Some attempt was made to classify the causes of design 
error, although in no case was there a sufficient evidence for 
an accurate classification. The entries are largely guesses. 
The classification used was: 
Unknown phenomena/unknown at design time) 
Complex system effects 
Cross specialisation, or inter disciplinary problems 
Oversight 
Communication problem 
Calculation or sizing error 
A single error could well have many causes. 
Table 3 
'Seriousness' proved difficult to ludge for many of the 
incidents. A simple Yes-No classification was used, an incident 
being deemed serious if it involved an explosion; loss of life; 
unscheduled release of radioactivity; excessive pressurevessel 
pressure, temperature or temperature rate of change; break of 
a primary cooling system pipe, or lack of primary cooling system 
isolation; or disabling of one complete safety mechanism (eg. all 
shut down rods). 
The stage at which the incident was observed was also recorded, 
because this also haB a bearing on seriousness. Many seriou; design 
errors are detected during commissioning, and do not appear -.. 
operating statistics. It is desirable to gain some impression 
of how many design errors are found at this stage, since the 
commissioning tests themselves are not perfect. The stage of 
discovery classification is as follows: 
Early commissioning, before fuel load EC 
Late commissioning, after fuel load LC 
Operation OP 
Maintenance and scheduled testing MN 
Post maintenance test PM 
V 
C 
S 
0 
K 
Z 
Table » 
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Whether an incident involved common mode failures was deter-
mined by an unusual rule - if the failure mechanism affected 
several components which were previously thought independent, 
then a common mode failure was deemed to have occurred, even 
though only one component contributed directly to the failure. 
This is in accordance with a philosophy of recording 'near 
misses', as well as •hits*. 
(2) In general, we take account of that experience which ia 
closest to us and often only that which is dramatic. Too much 
credit is taken for 30© reactor years of safe operation -
meaning only freedom from large accidental releases of fission 
products, failing to see or adequately to have regard to all 
those minor and son«times major features of equipment or of 
organisation which might so nearly have led to disaster. 
'Farmer, F.R. IAEA-SH-169M3 
Provided the rules are applied uniformly, and their definition 
remembered when interpreting results, no undue bias should be 
introduced by recording 'near misses'. 
Whether a long chain of events were involved in the incident 
was recorded. Typical long chains of events are a failure leading 
to level control problems, leading to overflow, leading to turbine 
or piping damage. Whether the there were 
several initial independent causes for the incident recorded. 
Such incidents usually involve 'unrevealed faults' or 'latent' faults 
In order to enable some feeling for the kind of problems 
involved to be built up, the equipment involved and the failure 
mechanism involved were recorded using an adhoc classification 
system. 
. 
Capacitor 
Condenser 
Control 
Control rod 
Cere 
Fuel 
Cas treatment system 
Heat exchanger 
Insulation (thermal) 
Icn exchanger 
Instrument 
Level sensor 
Noggle 
Pipe 
Pipe support 
Potentiometer 
Power generator 
Power supply 
Pump 
Pump seal 
recorder 
Relay 
Solenoid valve 
Switch (electrical) 
Tank 
Transformer 
Tubing 
Turbine 
Valve 
Valve actrator 
Weld 
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Table 5 
EQUIPMENT CODING 
CAT-
CON 
CTf 
i F. 
' C* 
F 
CAS 
HEX 
TIST? 
IE:-: 
I'iS 
LVL 
;;: 
P 
SUP 
POT 
GEt; 
FWP 
PHP 
?-, 
PE 
PLY 
SOI.V 
sw 
TMK 
TEMP 
TUB 
TPE 
V 
VAC7 
WLD 
- 24 -
ACJ 
BI,K 
BSK 
CIR 
CKEM 
CAL 
CLOSS 
COR 
CCUPL 
CRC 
T 
EA 
ES 
EXPL 
FL 
FTG 
GOD 
HYD 
INF 
IMP 
IMD 
LK 
LWL 
LMT 
LOOS 
MF 
MIS 
MISS 
NOISE 
RAD 
SEQ 
SKK 
ST" 
ST;. 
SPUR 
TH 
TRANS 
VAC 
VIB 
W 
Table 6 Failure mechanics code 
Mechanical adjustment 
Blockage 
Broken component 
Short/open circuit 
Chemical 
Calibration 
Loss of control 
Corrosion 
Powerline coupling 
Crack 
Loss of electric power 
Energy accumulation 
Energy release 
Explosion 
Unwanted flow 
Fatigue 
Act of god 
Hydraulic effect, water hammer 
Interruption of information flow 
e.g. measurement information 
Steam impingement 
Abnormal indication 
Leak 
Low water level 
Temperature/pressure excess 
Loose part 
Missing flow 
Impact, missile 
Missing component 
Instrument noise 
Exposure to radiation 
Operation sequence error 
Sneak path 
Sticking 
Stress 
Spurious information 
Thermal (stress) 
Control transient 
Loss of vaccuum (in condenser etc.) 
Vibration 
Wear, lifetime exceeded etc. 
Table 7. Failure related occurences reported in 1971 for BWR's 
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The contents of this table were abstracted from 'Safety Related 
Occurrences reported in 1971', R.L. Scott and R.B. Gallagher, 1972, 
ORNL-NSIC-106. 
Many of the classifications were checked against original Docket 
reports, and the classifications given are the responsibility of 
this author. 
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Sources of Bias 
While the statistics show a correlation between the 
degree of seriousness of a failure and whether a design error 
was involved, at least part of this correlation is due to bias 
in data collection. The reporting and classification habits of the 
incident reporters have a strong effect on the data, a problem 
which is difficult to acoid for a general purpose data bank of 
the kind used. For example the data include some ROE reports, and 
this include a high proportion of design and common mode failures 
since one of their objectives is to inform about new failure modes. 
Judgement of what constitutes a 'serious incident' may be 
biassed, because the eventual consequence of each failure could 
in some cases only be guessed. 
When system failure rates are estimated from component failure 
data, the results are in principle based on equipment failures 
alone. Statistics of the kind produced here, and in the Safety 
Related occurrences reports, can be used to provide a multipli-
cation factor, which in turn can be used to give a crude estimate 
of the failure from all types of data. The correlations produced 
here suggest that a different factor should be used depending on 
whether all incidents are concerned, or only serious incidents. 
However most of the available equipment failure rate data is 
already biassed to some extent, in that a proportion of design, 
installation and fabrication faults, are included. 
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Discussion 
The statistical study provides an indication that design 
errors might be more significant than their number suggests, 
because from the data collected 'serious' incidents are more 
strongly associated with design errors than with equipment fail-
ures. Equipment failures are used almost exclusively in judging 
the cost and consequences of failure for process plant. However, 
the data should be viewed with care. There are many sources of 
bias in the data collection process, and the results should be 
regarded as an indication of a possible association, rather than 
as evidence for a definite association. 
Serious 
Not 
Design 
Number 
2t 
13 
% 
65% 
35% 
Equipment 
Number 
11 
HO 
% 
22% 
88% 
Table 8 
A surprisingly high number of design errors were not discovered 
until operation of plant. This may mean that there are many errors 
which are discovered during construction and commissioning, but 
are not considered to have safety significance, and are not re-
ported. 
Stage at which fault was discovered for design errors 
Early commissioning k 11 % 
Late commissioning 1 3 % 
Operation 21 57 t 
Maintenance 8 22 % 
Post maintenance testing 3 8 t 
Table 9 
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Many of the errors, especially the "oversight" errors, could 
have been prevented by simple checks in computer aided design 
programs if such had been used. Unfortunately, no data was avail-
able on the role played by information dissemination (or lack of 
it) in design errors, and so it proved impossible to determine 
how far improved information systens could help in reducing design 
errors. 
That oversight and calculation errors are significant, is shown 
by the following table. 
Complex system 
Unknown phenomena 
Oversight 
Inter disciplinary 
Calculation 
Design errors 
9 
6 
12 
1 
10 
Note: Some incidents have several causes. Classification is 
subjective Con the part of the author). Errors due to 
design team communication problems could not be 
recorded. 
Table 10 
Calculation errors seem to be more serious than other types, 
though the size of statistical sample is too low, and there are 
too many sources of bias, to draw firm conclusions 
Design error type Serious Not serious 
Complex system t S 
Unknown phenomenon 3 3 
Oversight 7 5 
Interdisciplinary 1 
Calculation 9 1 
Table 11 
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Since a design objective is to avoid common failure modes, 
the concept of a "common mode random component failure' does not 
exist. The one apparent exception to this rule, shown in the 
tables, with accession number 60093, is interesting. Several pipes 
were affected by stress corrosion cracking. Since the true cause 
of these failures could not be identified, at the time of the 
incidents, but the design was not changed, the failures must be 
accepted as common mode equipment failures. 
That common mode effects are relatively common in association 
with design errors, is shown by the following table. 
Common mode failure s 
Eesien errors 
Table 12 
Design errors appear to be contributors to a sequence of fail-
ures, with safety consequences, rather than sole causes of fail-
ure, in most cases. 
Multiple causes 
Design errors 
Single cause 
7 
19% 
Multiple cause 
30 
81% 
Table 13 
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Turning to specific failure modes, control rod and shut down 
rod timing is one frequent problem. From the original records it 
can be seen that this is a recognised problem, with no simple 
avoidanceprocedure. 
A large proportion of the faults were circuit faults, (i>10%) 
which should be amenable to sneak path analysis, especially if 
this could be extended to take account of noise effects. 
Of the design faults a large proportion involved jams and 
blockages (^20%). An analysis similar to sneak path analysis, or 
cause consequence analysis, but in terms of mechanical or hydraulic 
linkages, would prove very useful here. 
Another large group of design faults involved instrument 
adjustment and mechanical setting (18%). These are problems 
generally involved with comissioning, and are difficult to deal 
with on new plant. In most cases additional test procedures to 
confirm design assumptions, and some improved communication be-
tween design and commissioning engineers would be required to 
reduce the frequency of this type of error. 
A good deal of investigation would have to be done, to determine 
if any worthwhile improvements could be achieved at reasonable cost. 
Control oscillations represent about S% of the design problems 
and confirm the value of 'plant simulation'. Extensions of the 
usual simulations, to include erroneous valve opening and blockage 
would appear to be very relevant. 
In all, safety incidents due to design error appears to be 
about as frequent as safety incidents due to wear, corrosion, 
and similar unavoidable mechanisms. This is a tribute to the high 
standard of component reliability achieved in process plant. How-
ever, it also poses a problem, since conventional techniques are 
not so useful in reducing the problems of design errors. Also, 
desigi. errors tend to be more serious than simple hardware failures. 
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Statistical Study II 
The first study of abnormal occurrences in nuclear power plant 
(Statistical study I) showed that design errors are significant 
in determining overall plant reliability. However, it was felt 
that the results might be unduly pessimistic, because data from 
construction and operation were treated together. For that reason, 
in this second study, as a first step all abnormal occurrences 
reported for two nuclear power plants during one year of operation, 
were studied and classified. 
Once again it proved difficult to determine how significant 
the incidents were, from a safety point of view, and in any case, 
the number of really significant incidents in two power stations 
during one year would be too low to provide a representative pic-
ture. 
The USAEC's definition of Directly Significant Events (USAEC 
office of operations evaluation, Summary of abnormal occurrences 
reported to the Atomic Energy Commission during 1973, 0OE-0S-001) 
provides good criteria for significance of an incident -
1) The release of radioactive materials from the site is in 
excess of limits set forth in Technical Specifications. 
2) Significant property damage or personal injury. 
3) Violation of a safety limit (on process variable values) set 
forth in technical specifications. 
These criteria also have the advantage of being easy to apply. 
However, for completeness, a further criterion would have to be 
added 
t) The probability of a very significant or catastrophic incident 
was raised significantly. 
This criterion is very difficult to apply without detailed 
plant knowledge, and also access to fault tree analyses for each 
plant. 
To overcome this problem of finding adequate records of sig-
nificant events, in a further part of this study, group of events 
selected by the USAEC as worthwhile reporting in their 'Reactor 
Operating Experiences' bulletins, was used as a sample of 'sig-
nificant' incidents. The sampling process involved has many dis-
advantages from the point of view of statistical study, but it 
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gives convenient access to a group of incidents which are con-
sidered significant. The records for 1972 were classified and 
recorded. Only incidents in light water power reactors were con-
sidered relevant. 
The classification of incident causes is similar to that given 
earlier. 
Table 1U. Incident causes 
Cause Cause subclass 
C Random component failure M Mechanical 
E Electrical 
D Design error U Unknown phenomenon 
C Complex system effects 
I Interdisciplinary problem 
0 Oversight 
K Communication problem 
Z Calculation, sizing error 
S Component selection error 
P Procedure error 
I Installation error 
F Fabrication fault 
M Maintenance error 
0 Operator error 
A failure was classified as a random component failure if it 
was of a type known and accepted by engineers as inevitable in 
normal engineering practice, or if the cause could not be ident-
ified sufficiently closely to prevent future failure. Normal 
bearing wear, relay contact wear, aging effects on transistors, 
are all examples of this kind of failure. Design errors once again 
include problems due to effects unknown at design time, but which 
can be prevented in the light of experience. The criteria for 
classification as a design error are 
a) The designer acknowledges the error, or 
b) The design is changed after the failure, or 
c) The same failure occurs repeatedly, at a frequency which is 
obviously unacceptable. 
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A new subclass, component selection errors, was introduced 
in view of the frequency of this kind of error. It is defined as 
errors which result in using a component in an unsuitable environ-
ment . 
Procedure errors are a new class, similar to design errors. 
A procedure error was deemed to have occurred if 
a) A procedure error was acknowledged, or 
b) Procedures were changed after the failure. 
Fabrication faults were recorded in those cases where the 
cause of the error was acknowledged to be in component manufacture. 
(Such faults might have many causes, mechanical, human, or even 
design of the manufacturing process). 
Operator errors were recorded where the operator departed 
from correct cperating procedure, or where operating procedures 
were non existent, and the operators actions led directly to fail-
ure. 
A new procedure was used for recording incidents with multiple 
causes. Each cause is recorded separately, with all the causes 
for an incident recorded in one sequence. Initial and contributory 
causes are distinguished, and also whether the individual failures 
are latent or immediate. A latent failure is one for which 
the effect occurs some time after the failure, in response to 
some event independent of the failure. For example, shut down relay 
failure may not be noticed until a situation requiring shut down 
occurs. 
As an attempt to get some indication of potential seriousness 
or otherwise of each incident, the stage at which the incident was 
observed was recorded. Only two stages were involved, operation 
(OP) and surveillance testing (SUR). It was also recorded whether 
the reactor was operating at power for the operational incidents 
(P). To distinguish between incidents occurring during surveillance 
testing, but resulting in unwanted consequences, it was recorded 
whether each incident was 'actual' (A) or found under test (T). 
'Actual' failures are those for which the consequences occur, 
instead of being prevented by testing. 
To guard against excessive pessimism with respect to common 
mode failures, both common mode effects and common mode consequences 
were recorded. A common mode effect was deemed to be involved if 
several components, assumed to be independent, were affected by the 
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same failure cause sufficiently to show some marks of the effect. 
A common mode consequence was deemed to have occurred, if the 
common mode effect resulted in failure to function in more than 
one component. 
For the cause classes, a 1 indicates that either one of the 
indicated classes might have been correct. A comma between classi-
fication symbols indicates that both types of cause were involved. 
OP 
Table IF. Incident characteristic codes 
Occured during operation 
~,JR Occured during surveillance 
testing 
p Operation at power 
A Actual incident 
j Failure found under test 
g Revealed,immediate 
UR Unrevealed, latent 
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27/7/72 
31/7/72 
31/8/72 
28/7/72 
15 /8 /72 
7 /11 /72 
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CJU Procedure for APPM c a l i b r a t i o n 
in e:*ror 
HCPI 
HPCI turbine control valve con-
tained plastic pipe cap 
u Pecco switches 
Opersttor turned mode switch to 
RUN instead of STARTUP 
Loose screws or. isolator notor 
conte.ctor prevented valve 
closure 
Rust in head orifix of air rela 
caused delay in starting diesel 
also 'spurious' alarm 
Failure of diff.pressure switch 
bellews on building/torus 
vacuum breaker 
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168 
191, 168 
17« 
172, 
205 
171, 172 
Honticello 
2 0 / 9 / 7 3 
16/12/72 
15,19/12/' 
15/12/72 
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OP 
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SUR 
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OP 
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u to 
0,C 
>< 55 55 j j x 55 
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UR 
UR 
Boot tieal on terms vacuum break« 
b u t t e r f l y valve not i n f l a t e d -
x c e s i i v e dearance on p i l o t 
va lvt ac tuator 
RHR pump motor a i r d e f l e c t o r 
crack * damage, shor t ing in pum| 
c o i l . New des ign 
Teflon packing ir. b u t t e r f l y 
valve (vacuum breaker) gland« 
outgassed * s t i c k i n g 
Non dosure could not be indicat« 
- new contact switch des ign 
required 
At low flow, river water forced 
dirt into RHR service water 
pump glands 
Torus suction ring Langer sup-
ports all were weak 
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REACTOR OPERATING EXPERIENCE REPORTS 1972 
M B 1 
w o 
SUR3 
SUR; 
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,D 
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: , D 
D 
D 
p 
D 
c 
c 
D 
D 
1 ,Z 
s,c 
z 
z 
M 
M 
c 
c I 
H X ~r 
Fuel handling grapple spring 
became fset' dropped fuel ont 
core support plate - new spri 
design 
Galling on fuel prevented pro 
grapple seating, dropped fuel 
microswitch check installed 
Relay contacts welded due to 
vibration, caused uncontrolle« 
raising of irradiated fuel. Hi 
suppression + interlock fittei 
Strainer torn in pieces by 
surges, turbulence 
Manual shutdown could displace 
a pin in govern or linkage -
oversize 
Pin- fitted, new operating pro-
cedure 
Air start motor solenoid valve 
jammed - air supply taken fron 
wrong side of lubricator 
Weld slag in air starter motor 
supply line 
Air starter motor 
ken ' 
:ylinder bro 
Grozen fuel priming pump 
Timing of hydraulic governor c 
in too late - pressure switch 
wrongly sited, moved 
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O 
5S 
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72-U 
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SUR? 
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SUR? 
OP 
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M 
Z 
B? 
al 
IN 
IN 
CON 
18 
iff 
5 
UR 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
T 
T 
7 
? 
A 
A 
Rust in air starter motor supp. 
Drop in oil pressure raised ir-
relevant alarm 
Hydraulic accumulator tube 
failed, replaced with flexible 
coupling 
Dirty fuel, and operator had 
not reset overspeed trip 
Generator rotor balance weight 
bolts sheared 
Two diodes in exciter failed 
Diesel generator speed not 
reset after shut down 
Diesel coolant pump failed 
Coolant boost pump could not 
start - static pressure pre-
vented low pressure actuation_ 
og boost pump - circuit modifi 
Warm weather activated cut out 
interlock circuits 
Lubrication oil supply line to 
long. Low pressure in cold 
weather prevented start 
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UR 
UR 
UR 
UR 
UR 
UR 
UR 
R 
A 
A 
A 
A 
Power supply loss - fuse blou 
prevented start of gas turbir 
Cause of blown fuse was loose 
relay terminal - short circui 
Tube oil pump motor brush rig 
position wrong 
Tube oil temp set point too 1 
Tube oil heaters undersized 
Forgot? to reinstall tube oil 
reservoir vent line 
Gas turbine air start motor 
seal leaks 
Oil pump switch in 'hand' pos 
ition, caused oil to be ex-
pelled from system 
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OP 
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£8 
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E 
M 
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C 
BS 
IN 
IN 
IN 
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CON 
CON 
1 
F 
UR 
UR 
UR 
UR 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
During test, battery driver, oi 
pump was not stopped. Depleted 
battery 
Loss of DC Power caused reacto 
then turbine trip, prevented 
switch to emergency power -
lubrication lost. Turbine siez 
Low air flow in instrument air 
dryer - heater ignited filter 
paper, melted, silver soldered 
air header 
Short circuit in charcoal filt 
heater 
Oil leak from pump motor beari 
thermo couple junction box. 
Dripped onto hot pipe 
High pressure oil line rupture 
seeped onto hot oil volute. 
Replaced by new design 
After surveillance trip, recir 
culation pumps would not re-
start, one due to limit switch 
failure, the other due to time 
delay inaladjustment and pros-
sure switch drift, Seals were 
damaged because the pumps coul 
not be isolated. RHR a isolati 
valves failed 
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72-8 
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72-11 
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OP 
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E 
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C 
CON 
C OH 
CON 
IN 
CON 
IN 
CON 
CON 
Valve failures 
Torque switches on pump iso-
lation valves wrongly set 
Torus baffles displaced by 
safety valve line air compres 
sion, displacing torus water 
Baffle damage brok vacuum 
breaker valve air line 
Shott circuit 
Plub overload test procedure, 
cause destruction of heater 
control components 
Damper binding caused exhaust 
of containent air to stack 
Control wiring error to dampc 
Damaged FET in 
Offsite substation trip, arci 
Protective relay delays were 
too long i gave generator over 
current trip 
Main generator breaker timing 
failed - SCR short 
g 
J 
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TTCJJ 
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••2-11 
72-12 SUR 
OP 
P 
D 
C,I 
D 
C.F 
0 
J 
0 
M,d 
CON 
CON 
COM 
: UR 
UR 
Remote control wiring discon-
nected from circuit breaker -
omission after maintenance 
Torque switch setting on emer-
gency condensate return valve 
too highly valve jammed 
Operators had no procedure lo 
this circumstance - would havi 
allowed full blowdown - senio; 
engineer stopped it 
Loss of instrumentation, no 
emergency power 
Safety valve tripped, bellows 
ruptured 
Dry well cooling fans' crud 
pumps triplet, had no auto 
restart for emergency power 
Stress corrosion cracking of 
turbine bucket pins - Cutting 
oil contamination 
Weld penetration deficient on 
level controller of turbine 
steam reheater - broke. Radi-
ation exposure 
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COX 
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COh 
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coh 
CON 
C Oh 
COK 
C Oh UR 
Turbine control dadpot vibrat 
loose 
This caused instability, vibr 
tion( damaging other componen 
Relief valve opened early 
(spr.ing relaxation), would no 
close (erosion) 
Pilot valves of relief valve 
not designed for environment 
Condensate looster pump trip, 
causing two feed pumps to tri] 
- low NPSH. Reactor tripped 
Feedwater manual control lock* 
out by low pressure due to 
rapid close demand isolation 
valve stalled, high different! 
pressure 
Safety valve opened early, 
pressurising containment, acti 
ating ECCS, 
Safety valve jet damaged reli« 
valve 
Feedwater level control proce-
dures revised 
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Failure of safety valve he«der 
during hot functional test -
Designer had not allowed for 
dynamic forc«6 
Many structural components, 
some valves, damaged, pressure 
transmitters destroyed 
Not counted in statistics 
Epoxy flowed onto control rod 
magnetic clutch 
Control rod energy absorbing 
dash pots, when unfilled, did 
not absorb energy. This led to 
damage and non performance 
Control rod motor dutch drag-
ging led to intermittent CP.P 
malfunction 
Loose dowel pins caused gallin 
of clutch 
Alarm signals could not respon 
quickly enough 
Motor clutch slip 
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Discussion II 
The distribution of causes in the second statistical study 
still shows a heavy emphasis on design errors, as Table 17 shows. 
However, an effect which steels some light on the failure avoid-
ance and design process, was observed in reading the original 
failure reports (Table 15). Whether a failure is classed as a 
design error or a random component failure depends on how diffi-
cult it is to determine the true cause of failure. With the op-
portunity to search further, there is a tendency to reclassify 
failures as design errors. This is especially true if several 
failures of the same kind occur, as there is then an opportunity 
to build up experience of causes, and an incentive for more 
thorough analysis of incidents. 
Another effect is shown by the class of 'component selection' 
design errors. In most cases these failures were due to calibratio 
shift in pressure switches. In many cases the direct cause was 
vibration. The cases classified as design errors were those in 
which the instruments were replaced by a different type, or a 
design modification was made to reduce the effects of vibration, 
etc. 
Design 28 Ml% oversight 
component selection 
complex system 
effect unknown at 
design time 
calculation error 
Operator 
Component 
Insta l la t ion/maintenance 
Procedure 
Unknown 
3 
18 
12 
5 
_2 
68 
14. I t 
27* 
18% 
7.i»% 
3% 
100.81 
mechanical 
e l e c t r i c a l 
communication 
overs ight 
complex system 
10 
7 
3 
11 
5 
2 
1 
2 
Table 17. Distribution of causes of failure for two reactors 
during one year. 
De s i gn 
Operator 
Component 
Installation/ 
maintenance/ 
fabrication 
Procedure 
Unknown 
H3 
1 
26 
U6% 
t.3% 
28« 
oversight 
component selection 
complex system ef-
fect 
effect unknown at 
design time 
calculation/sizing 
error 
communication prob-
lem 
mechanical 
electrical 
8 
1 
19 
7 
6 
2 
19 
7 
11 
7 
_2 
93 
12% 
7.5% 
2.2% 
100% 
Table 18. Distribution of causes of failure - Reactor operating 
experiences 1972 (Power reactors). 
Such failures can still, however, be regarded as equipment 
failures, or maybe should be regarded as a class for themselves. 
All but one of the 'component selection' failures could be re-
garded in this way, the proportion of such errors being 12% (re-
maining 'design error' failures form 29% of all failures). 
Once again, it proved difficult to draw conclusions about the 
relative significance or seriousness of incidents. The 'Reactor 
Operating Experiences' reports were disappointing in this respect, 
since they include many incidents which are not too serious in 
themselves, but which are of a type which is relatively frequent. 
Table 18 gives the cause distribution for these incidents, although 
the results should be viewed with care, since it has not been 
possible for the author to determine the exact criteria for choice 
of these incidents. 
One thing which is clear from the studies is that there are 
very few single failure incidents which are serious in themselves 
(as would be expected). There were surprisingly many incidents 
- 59 -
involving many independent failures (Fig. 2 and 3 ) . One would, 
a priori, expect the probability of multiple failures to be very 
low. Apparently, when one or two initial failures occur, they can 
bring the power plant into a state where several latent failures 
reveal themselves. This view is derived from some typical inci-
dents and is supported by table 19 and fig. 2 and 3. 
To give an example of the significance (and surprise) involved 
in table 2 and 3, consider a 'typical' failure rate of 0.01 per 
year, or 0.01 per activation for intermittently working components. 
The ratio of single failures to (say) six fold failures would, 
on a simple hypothesis be 0.01:(0.01) , or 10 :1. Even with un-
realistically high failure rates of 0.1, the ratio should be 10 :1, 
rather than approximately 25:1, as observed. There are several 
possible explanations of this discrepancy, all of which seem to 
be required. 
1. Most of the single failures which occur are not in any way 
significant to safety, and are therefore not reported as 
abnormal occurrences. This effect might account for as much 
as one or two orders of magnitude, but not nine. 
2. Safety systems and shut down systems are especially failure 
prone, in that thsy incorporate very large numbers of com-
ponents. They are only brought into effect after at least 
one failure has occurred, and therefore will be responsible 
for a number of 'double failures'. This effect might again 
explain a difference of an order of magnitude, though one 
would still expect the ratio between double failures and 
higher order multiple failures to be several orders of mag-
nitude larger than it is. 
3. Safety systems are tested periodically, rather than continu-
ously by use. Presumably the failure rates for intermittently 
operating systems are higher than for continuously operating 
systems in spite of high test frequencies. It is worth noting 
that maintenance and design errors are not usually considered 
in setting test frequencies. 
t. For intermittently operating systems with complex event se-
quences, and particularly for safety systems, there are very 
many different operating situations to account for. This 
means that there are many different failure types to account 
Mo of 
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observed 
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Fig. 2. Histogram of number of 'actual' incidents involving 
several independent failures, For two operating reactors during 
one year. 
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for, for the later failures in a sequence. Design errors which 
are not detected during testing, usually require special cir-
cumstances for failure to result. 
Common mode failures. (Though these cannot explain the large 
number of independent failures). 
immediate/revealed 
latent/unrevealed 
initial contributory total 
23 
1 
21 
2 
11 
13 
25 
12 
37 
Table 19. Revealed/Immediate and unrevealed/latent failures, 
correlated with initial/contributory failures. (Two reactors 
during 1972). Operational or actual incidents only. 
The number of incidents involving several independent failures 
was, as can be seen, quite high. Common mode failure effects were 
also fairly wide spread, as can be seen from table 20. 
Failure cause 
Design 
26 
Operation 
Component? 
Procedure 
Installation/ 
maintenance 
Total 
65 
No common 
mode effect 
5 
19% 
3 
1"* 
t 
9 
35 
5H* 
Common mode effect. 
No common mode 
consequence 
7 
27* 
0 
1 
e 
12* 
Common mode 
consequence 
m 
54* 
0 
4 
2 
2 
22 
3D* 
Incidents were classified as component failures if no design modi-
fications were made. Common mode failures would result in immediate 
modification, if the failures in themselves threatened safety and 
would hence be defined as design errors. 
Table 20. Common mode effects for two reactors during one year. 
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The kind of effects involved in multiple failures, and explained 
in point four, can be illustrated by steam release incidents in 
boiling water reactors. A coupling of control and safety valve 
problems has lead in several cases to a release of steam and hot 
boiler water into containment. The new component environment has 
then revealed problems with cable, terminal and motor insulation, 
as well as containment isolation valve problems. To test a complete 
reactor in an atmosphere of steam and hot water would presumably 
be unrealistic, but it is this kind of changed environment which 
reveals problems. 
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Conclusions 
One clear conclusion from these studies is that design errors 
are an important factor in nuclear power plant reliability. It 
seems likely that this is a consequence of the use of redundancy 
techniques, which in turn reduce the problems of random component 
failure. For anticipated failures the probabilities cf serious 
consequences become vanishingly small. As the consequences of 
random component failure diminish, so the relative significance 
of design errors increases. 
A. Ideally, a study of this kind would provide information for 
estimating the impact of design errors on reliability. In fact, 
part of the evidence was helpful in this way. For nuclear power 
plant abnormal occurrences, the ratio of 'design error failures' 
to random component failures, is reasonably constant. The value 
of the ratio lies between 1:1 and 1:U normally. However, direct 
quantitative conclusions cannot be drawn, for the following 
(rather long) chain of reasons. 
1. There is some evidence that more serious failures may be 
associated with design errors, but it is difficult to judge 
the size of this effect\ to what extent it is due to preva-
lence of common mode failures among design errors i and to 
what extent it arises from the unusual (unpredictable) con-
sequences of design errors. 
2. The 'failure rate' data obtained from reliability data banks 
already contains some allowance for design errors, but the 
extent of this allowance is not usually known, and varies 
from component to component. 
3. While the consequences of random failure are relatively 
easy to predict (because the models of failure are well 
known), the consequences of design error are in many cases 
very difficult to predict. If the type of design error were 
known to the 'reliability analyst', he would tell 'the de-
signer', and the problem would disappear. This problem is 
especially associated with 'mis-wiring' design errors, or 
mis location of components, so that they affect each other 
adversely, or the use of ircorrect design objectives. 
k. While the problem of judging the consequences of design 
error are large in some cases, in many others, the failure 
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mechanism can be predicted. For example, component selection 
errors usually lead directly to 'non-functioning1 failures. 
The problems of estimating the effect of design error may 
eventually be solved by extending reliability analysis back to 
the design stage. On the othej1 hand, it may prove easier simply 
to reduce the problem, so that design errors have an insignificant 
effect on reliability. 
P. Some of the 'design errors1 were encouraging, in that there 
is a clear route to reducing their number. 'Component selection' 
problems should be very significantly reduced by rapid feed back 
of failure data to design teams, by type testing, and by stan-
dardisation of components, as practised for Canadian, and with 
increasing thouroughness, for U.S. reactor systems. 
0. 'Complex system' analysis techniques seem relevant to reducing 
the number of design errors, and possibly also the number of 
procedural errors. Sneak path analysis, cause consequence analysis, 
routeing analysis, and common mode failure analysis have a clear 
role to play. Development of systematic techniques for studying 
the effects of blockage and of hydraulic effects such as vibration 
and water hammer would be worthwhile. 
D. Lesign errors resulting from unknown effects should be reduced 
significantly in frequency, as more experience is gained of stan-
dardised plant types. 
E. One of the most significant findings in this study, was the 
unexpectedly high number of incidents involving several independent 
failures. These involved long sequences of events, with as many 
as nine independent failures involved. The rate of occurrence 
was several orders of magnitude larger than would be expected 
simply by multiplying together the necessary number of •typical1 
failure rates. 
Such multiple failures involved shut down sequences for the 
most part. They can be explained by the large number of different 
sequences under different failure conditions; the large number of 
components involved; and the number of unrevealed and latent errors 
which manage to avoid discovery during testing. These last can 
presumably be explained as failures arising due to unusual cirr 
cumstances during shutdown, and design errors which only gradually 
show their effects. Operator errors played £ r6le in many of the 
long sequences. 
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It is worth mentioning in this context that nor.e of the inci-
dents studied resulted in a design basis accident. Further, as 
far as the author could tell, ir no case did any of the long 
sequences of failures bring the state of the plant significantly 
close to a design be.sis accident. It would be interesting to see 
how far down a design basis accident fault tree it has been 
possible for an incident to progress. From the evidence available 
here it appears that the policy of diversity of safety systems 
has been very successful. 
During review of the draft of this paper, it was suggested 
to the author that 'the failures' which occurred during 'multiple 
failures incident' are not truly independent. The original causes 
of various latent failures nay be independent, but the triggering 
of these failures, t*3 produce serious consequences, is far from 
independent, This view is correct, and shews that the concept of 
'independent failures' must be treated with care. A cable may be 
short circuited in two widely separated points by two different 
mechanisms (latent failures), but will only result in serious 
consequences, if electrical power is applied (triggering event). 
The fact remained that in reliability analyses, one must antici-
pate several independent latent failures. 
It has also been pointed out that the definition of design 
error - a situation in which a failure leads to design modifi-
cation - will automatically increase the number of recorded fail-
ures for an incident. This is in fact only true for those cases 
where material failure was the initiating incident, and where 
the design change was to avoid consequences of an incident of 
the same type i.e. where the failed component was replaced in 
its original form, but some additional safety measures were 
introduced. In any case, the surprising nature of the results 
gathered is not that incidents with many failures occur, but 
that the frequency of 3 fold failure, for example is not signifi-
cantly different from the frequency for six fold or seven fold 
failure. 
Analysis techniques have been developed to treat situations 
of the type observed in these studies (see e.g. D.S. Nielsen, 1973). 
It is hoped that some quantitative information about frequency 
and seriousness of multiple latent failures can be obtained, by 
application of the techniques to more detailed data, for which 
'trivial failure' statistics exist, and for which the number of 
components at risk is knewn. 
What can be done about design errors? 
Design errors play a significant ro.'e in process plant failure. 
Design errors accounted for some 22% of reported safety related 
occurrences for light water rjactors in 1971 (Classification of 
design errors, examples, and some statistics are given later). 
It is not difficult to see why design errors occur. To dimen-
sion a single flow control valve requires some 2 0-30 design 
decisions. Some components especially those subject to high press-
ure, high temperature, or corrosive conditions, require many more. 
Systems design and investigations of component interactions require 
many more decisions. Routeing of electric and fluid control circuits 
to avoid common mode failures involves knowledge of a very large 
number of possible interactions. A modern .process plant may contain 
in some cases hundreds of thousands of components each of which 
must be selected, individually dimensioned for its specific purpose, 
and its interactions with the rest of the system investigated. 
Given that any human task is failure prone it may seem sur-
prising that failures are not more frequent. Part of the answer is 
that designs are always based on earlier designs including rela-
tively few new components. In this respect, accelerating devel-
opment in techniques can give problems. A second part of the 
answer is that during construction, commissioning and testing, 
design failures are often found and corrected. This is no cause 
for overconfidence. Design errors are often sensitive to time and 
circumstance so that testing cannot find all the design failures 
in a system. The third reason that design errors are less frequent 
than might be expected, is that designs are checked by senior 
designers, by fitters, wiremen, and installation engineers who 
build the plant, and by the engineers, operators, and maintenance 
workers who eventually use the plant. 
Just how bad the problem could be is seen by considering the 
case of computer programming. This task is almost pure design. 
Each page of program involves some hundred decisions. And each 
page of programs contains some two or three errors when first 
completed (by an experienced programmer). Testing takes two or 
three times as long as design, and even after extensive use, all 
large computer systems fail regularly. The largest systems fail 
due to design errors every few hours. 
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fc'hat can be cone to reduce the number of design errors? One 
way of helping is to provide the designers with more information, 
in a more accessible form. Often in a design office, one lacks 
information on true component loadings, corrosion properties, 
and how a system is used in practice. Better feed back of infor-
mation from plant users is almost always requested by designers, 
if they are asked. 
Better use can generally be made of the experience of con-
structors and operators, as is shown by the success of 'suggestion 
box shemes' in many workshops. Given a chance, workmen responsible 
for installing and building equipment can almost always teach 
designers something about construction problems. They have also 
a better chance to learn of problems - intimate contact with a 
full size three dimensional plant, rather than the designers 
drawings. 
Design checking is less reliable than the original design 
process. There is a psychological effect which leads people to 
accept information completely if it contains very few errors. 
Making design checking more systematic helps a great deal in 
removing design errors. Such techniques as failure mode analysis, 
design check lists, and safety brainstorming are typical in this 
respect. Good working conditions, archive distribution, and 
systematic approval and countersigning of drawings also help. 
On-oite cross checking between drawings and installed equipment 
and updating of drawings after on site equipment modifications, 
are steps which are often neglected. And proper safety checking 
after maintenance, repair, or modifications, is particularly 
difficult to ensure. 
Computerised design represents an almost complete solution, 
in those areas where systematic design rules are possible. For 
example design of simple heat exchanger can be almost completely 
automated. If there are errors in design programs, they are 
generally gross errors and removed by simple manual cross checking 
of designs. A more subtle source of error is inappropriate design 
assumptions, or errors in design philosophy, which result in 
errors under special circumstances. 
Computerised design is difficult. Selection of components, 
processes, and forms depends on very many influences, and a large 
amount of implicit information, which is very difficult to organise. 
- 68 
Human beings are extremely good at selection and satisfying 
multiple objectives. 
Computerised checking of designs, on the other hand is in 
many cases easy. Once components have been selected, their 
properties and interrelations can be described, and their working 
evaluated. 
Simulation is a prime technique for checking designs. Automatic 
techniques for checking designs are being developed, in the field 
of chemical processes (Powers) and control systems (Fussel) (Taylor) 
The techniques for computer aided piping design could be readily 
adapted to design checking. Techniques for checking for sneak paths 
in electrical circuits are available (Rankin). And the extension 
of control system techniques to complete system techniques, involve 
few changes in principle. 
Extensions of techniques for checking controller designs 
(other examples mechanical design) could well be used for checking 
at least the written versions of operator instructions. Such a 
development would also be useful, in allowing more extensive 
interlock circuits to be designed, on the principle that any 
fault which can happen, will happen. (It should be remembered, 
though that not all failures can be prevented - interlocks cannot 
be designed to prevent failures arising from unknown phenomena, 
although diverse safety systems may do). 
There is one major barrier to using computerised design 
checking. It takes time, effort, and money. Designers are often 
hard pressed, and their work critical to completion dates. They 
have no time to spend copying their drawings into computers. 
It i s is even more true for the most dangerous design task, design 
of a repair (most system failures occur after repair). 
With systems which are really dangerous, or too complex to allow 
unrestricted modification, then rules for approval and inspection 
may be enforced. This can significantly reduce availability of 
process plant. 
If computerised design checking techniques are to be used at 
all, the computer must become as convenient as drawing paper. 
It must be easier to use computer aided design than not to use it. 
This means larger display screens, with better resolution. It 
also means much better ergonomic design of computer aided design 
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systems. 
Computer aided design promises to make design more reliable, 
by making information more readily available (design catalogues 
on magnetic tape are already available), and by making it possible 
to check that the correct relationships between system components 
are fulfilled. This is a hopeful sign, at a time when industrial 
systems are becoming much more complex. There is also some hope 
that the study of principles of design, necessary for the com-
puters benefit, can show how we can simplify our designs, ration-
alise their complexity, and better organise the ways we produce 
and understand them. 
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